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After a sharp decline in growth in 2009, Africa’s recovery now seems well underway. Africa has 
exhibited substantial resilience during this global recession, relative to most other developing 
regions and its own past record. While some factors driving Africa’s recovery have been 
external, the positive outcome to date has been mostly due to the good policies that countries 
implemented before and during the crisis.  
Nevertheless, substantial risks remain and have been only exacerbated by the recent European 
turmoil, while the challenge of bringing African countries on a path of high growth and poverty 
reduction has become even more pressing. This note discusses policies that would help make the 
continent’s recovery more robust and help achieve high longer-term growth. 
2. Africa:  Moderate  recovery under way but risks remain 
While the global financial crisis hit Africa later than other regions, the continent has not emerged 
unscathed. The output growth fell from average of 5.6 percent during 2001-08 to 2.5 percent in 
2009, while working poverty and unemployment, especially among the youth, escalated.  
However, the continent has shown resilience. Defying expectations, Africa has emerged from the 
crisis faster and more robustly than in the past and than most other regions. Growth will reach 
4.5 percent in 2010 and increase further to 5.2 percent in 2011 (Figure 1). As usual though, the 
aggregate numbers mask substantial differences across countries and regions. Economies most 
open to trade (e.g., commodity exporters), which slowed markedly in 2009, are expected to 
benefit from the revived commodity prices and trade, and thus record a relatively sharp V-shaped 
recovery (Figure 2).
1 Due to continued slowdown in remittances and FDI as well as possibly aid 
inflows, many low income and fragile countries are projected to grow at more sluggish rates. 
Overall, in 2010 about 60 percent of African countries are projected to grow at lower rates than 
on average during 2001–08.  
The other key macroeconomic variables are also projected to improve. Africa’s inflation is 
expected to be gradually returning towards mid-single digits in 2010 and 2011, as the impact of 
high commodity prices has waned and the aggregate demand remains subdued. Disinflation is 
faster among oil importing countries, due to cheaper imports and more subdued aggregate 
demand. The fiscal and current account balances of oil exporters are projected to strengthen in 
2010 and 2011 due to increased prices and demand. As a result of stimulus policies, oil importers 
will continue to post deficits well above the pre-crisis levels (Figure 3). 
Drivers of the continent’s recovery     
Sources of the continent’s recovery have also differed across countries. In addition to the global 
recovery, driven by developing Asia and expansionary policies in advanced countries, strong 
commodity demand and prices have played a key role in the revival of continent’s exports. 
Private capital flows are also projected to increase and some African frontier markets (e.g., 
                                                            
1 Oil (e.g. Angola) and commodity (e.g. Botswana) exporters, which were most adversely affected in 2009, are 
experiencing a relatively quick rebound, while growth of low income countries is subdued.  
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Ghana, Kenya) will benefit from improved access to international bond markets. In a number of 
countries (e.g. Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and others), the rebound was helped 
by stimulus packages. Prudent macroeconomic policies prior to the crisis, especially fiscal 
consolidation, as well as improved institutions of macroeconomic management provided space 
for fiscal stimulus initiatives. The financial support from IFIs, including the Bank, also played an 
important role in preventing large pro-cyclical fiscal cuts. In some countries improvements to 
business environments helped relieve structural bottlenecks. In others, government interventions 
stimulated agriculture and the overall private domestic demand (e.g., subsidy program in 
Malawi, distribution of inputs in Sierra Leone, and ICT use in Kenya). In East Africa, increased 
regional trade in part compensated for the slump in the global demand. 
However, the projected growth for 2010 and 2011 remains below the trend in most countries, as 
increased trade and financial linkages with Asia will not compensate for subdued demand from 
the advanced economies and increased cost of credit. In the EU and the US, the demand for 
African imports will not reach its pre-recession level in the short term due to deleveraging and 
fiscal consolidation. The ongoing debt problems in Europe have only heightened the 
uncertainties surrounding the global recovery.    
The impact of the debt crisis in Europe 
The ongoing global recovery remains fragile; risk of a double dip or slower-than-expected 
recovery in the EU or the US remains high. The “Greek debt crisis” could have the following 
impacts on Africa: (i) higher cost of capital for emerging market economies (e.g., South Africa) 
due to the public debt problems and the associated heightened sovereign risk; (ii) derailed 
European recovery because of large spending cuts; (iii) reduced export price competitiveness due 
to weakening euro. The re-priced risk, which will hamper access of many African countries to 
trade credit, reflects markets’ concerns about additional fiscal fallouts in Europe. Concerns about 
political instability fueled by the budget consolidation measures (reduced expenditures, increased 
taxes) may also take a toll. The increased cost of financing would reduce further the post-crisis 
trend growth.
2  
In the post-crisis economic environment, investors’ attention to economic policies and anxieties 
regarding “market failures” are likely to increase. This renewed emphasis on credibility and 
prudence of policies will require that African countries not only pursue prudent policies, but also 
communicate their stances more effectively to the public and the outside world. 
 
                                                            
2 For discussion of how the global financial crisis and
  other developments (climate change) may affect Africa’s 
trend growth, see Brixiova , Z.; Kamara, A. B.; and Ndikumana, L. (2010), “Containing the impact of the crisis and 
paving the way to strong recovery in Africa,” AfDB Policy Brief No. 2, February 2010. 
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3.  Exit strategies from stimulus package 
Stimulus packages in place 
Fiscal stimulus 
While substantial differences among countries emerged – based on their fiscal spaces and 
inflationary pressures – African countries have responded better to this crisis than in the past. 
Their fiscal measures also constituted a clear break from the pro-cyclical policies during the past 
crises and the pre-crisis boom. The scope for counter-cyclical measures varied with the level of 
income though, as richer countries have had a greater space for maneuver.  
As a part of their stimulus packages, a number of governments boosted investment 
(infrastructure in particular) and consumption (social spending) outlays, acting as “consumer of 
last resort”.
3 For example, South Africa implemented fiscal package to stimulate domestic 
demand that had also positive impact on other African countries, especially in the region. In 
absolute terms, South Africa’s package was the largest in Africa in 2009, while the one adopted 
by Tanzania was the largest as a share of GDP. Timely and effective measures that even low 
income countries were able to adopt (e.g. Uganda, Tanzania) demonstrated the strengthened 
quality of their institutions. With prudent packages, many African countries have emerged from 
the crisis with markedly stronger fiscal positions and lower public debts than advanced 
economies. 
Monetary and financial sector policy 
In 2009 a number of countries lowered their policy rates (e.g., WAEMU, CEMAC, South Africa, 
Mauritius, Botswana) and/or increased monetary bases (Tanzania) with a view to stabilize 
output. South Africa has even temporarily deviated from its inflation target.  While the longer 
term impact remains to be seen, the easing of monetary policy stance contributed to preventing a 
large fall in GDP growth and even greater escalation of unemployment.  
However, despite the expansionary monetary policy, credit to the private sector declined in a 
number of countries, especially in oil exporters due to reduced deposit bases (Figure 4).
4 
Commercial banks have invested in government securities, causing yields to decline and making 
these investments less attractive. Moreover, some low income countries (e.g., Kenya and Ghana) 
and especially fragile states (e.g., Sierra Leone) faced heightened inflationary pressures and were 
not able to lower their rates and expand money supply or even opted for monetary tightening.  
As African financial sectors were largely shielded from the impact of the crisis, direct 
government interventions in the banking sector were rare. Nigeria was the exception, where in 
August 2009 the Central Bank of Nigeria had to inject funds into the banking system, after five 
                                                            
3 For discussion of stimulus packages adopted by various African countries, see Kasekende, L.; Brixiova, Z. and 
Ndikumana, L. (2010), “Africa: Africa’s Counter-cyclical Responses to the Crisis,” Journal of Globalization and 
Development, Vol. 1 (1). 
  
4  The pro-cyclicality of liquidity in oil exporting countries is related to movements in both exports and the 
accompanying capital flows. 
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leading banks (40 percent of the banking sector) posted losses from non-performing loans due to 
excessive lending to the energy sector and the bursting of the stock market bubble. In Tanzania, 
the government set aside a part of the stimulus package for banks that have experienced rising 
non-performing loans. 
The need for orderly and gradual exits from stimulus policies  
While the macroeconomic policies adopted by African countries prior to the crisis served them 
overall well, governments still need to maintain healthy balance between short run stabilization 
and achieving high long-term growth.
5 Now that the stimulus packages have been put in place, 
the key questions are for how long to maintain them, at what speed to withdraw them, and how 
to coordinate exits across policies and countries.  
Fiscal policy: medium term consolidation 
In 2009, in many countries the actual fiscal deficits exceeded projections, pointing to more 
accommodative policies than initially expected (Figure 5). About 40 percent of African countries 
are projected to raise their fiscal deficits further this year relative to 2009, suggesting that 
African governments do not plan rushed exits from stimulus packages. Given the gradual revival 
of revenues that comes with higher growth, the widening deficits will be mostly caused by higher 
expenditures.
6   
Given uncertainties about the robustness of the global recovery and likely negative spillovers 
from the Greek debt crisis, where feasible, African governments could consider maintaining 
accommodative fiscal stance in 2011 as well. Such stance, while not sustainable over the longer 
term, would in the current circumstances increase predictability of policies, help gain public 
confidence and prevent “stop-go” patterns. As was the case until now, the increased (or 
maintained) expenditures should aim mainly at removing infrastructure bottlenecks, and 
establishing social safety nets. 
At the same time, in most countries the current fiscal trends are not sustainable over the medium 
term, and if not reversed, they would jeopardize hard won debt sustainability once again. They 
would also negatively impact longer term growth through higher interest payments, crowding out 
of the private sector, and reducing investors’ confidence. Fiscal consolidation to get public 
finance on sustainable path and refocus it on growth and development, rather than output 
stabilization, will be thus needed.  
To return to fiscal balance, African countries need to strengthen domestic revenue mobilization. 
At the same time, governments need to strengthen their expenditure management, protecting 
                                                            
5 A number of African low-income countries had inflation rates below 5 percent during 2001-08, but very few 
posted high enough growth to reach MDGs. Empirical literature shows that bringing inflation to very low levels in 
low income countries may come at the expanse of growth rates. See, for example, International Monetary Fund 
(2005), Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design Issues in Low Income Countries, Washington D. C.: IMF.  
 
6 In most of the countries where 2010 expenditures would decline relative to 2009, they would remain above the 
2008 levels. 
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social and capital outlays while maximizing efficiency on the wage bills and other current 
expenditures.
7  
Coordination of monetary and fiscal policies 
At the country levels, given the relatively low inflation rates, credible commitments to medium 
term fiscal consolidations should precede tightening of monetary stance for several reasons. 
First, in low-income countries, central banks are often not fully independent from the 
government. In the absence of external financing, loose fiscal policy would then undermine the 
aim of low inflation and the credibility of monetary policy.
8 Second, even though transmission 
mechanisms are undoubtedly more complex in developing than advanced countries, monetary 
policy is still technically and politically easier to implement than fiscal consolidation.
9  Third, 
increased interest rates that would result from tightened monetary policy would raise costs of 
debt repayment, thus making the fiscal consolidation more challenging. Finally, successful fiscal 
consolidation would slow down aggregate demand expansion, allowing for continued 
accommodative monetary stance without fueling inflation.  
Another reason against fast tightening of the monetary stance is the inflation-growth trade-off. In 
most countries inflation is already in single digits; the current accommodative stance should stay 
in place until high growth returns. Inevitably, such stance will be reversed as recovery takes firm 
hold, growth accelerates, and inflationary pressures reemerge. Among various options, a flexible 
inflation targeting, already officially practiced in South Africa and Ghana, may provide an 
appropriate framework for emerging and frontier market economies that aim at achieving low 
inflation while preventing undue output volatility.
10  
International and regional considerations also suggest that monetary tightening should come after 
the fiscal one, as fiscal policy has fewer international spillovers. Specifically, as tighter monetary 
policy will raise interest rates, it could attract extra private capital flows, also away from 
countries with slower recovery. This could start a vicious circle of retaliation and protectionism 
(including barriers on capital outflows) that may hamper the continent’s recovery. Moreover, in 
Africa’s regions that weathered the crisis particularly well due to enhanced regional trade (e.g., 
                                                            
7 For discussion of conditions under which fiscal tightening may have expansionary effect see Alesina, A. and 
Ardagna, S. (1998), “Tales of Fiscal Adjustment,” Economic Policy, 27, 487–545.   
 
8 Specifically, in countries with underdeveloped financial markets and in the absence of foreign aid, the central 
banks may need to finance budget deficits directly, which means they would not be able to pursue their intended 
monetary tightening anyway. Moreover, high domestic debts that resulted from deficits (e.g. Ghana) are likely to 
increase pressures on central banks to “inflate these debt burdens away.”   
 
9 The important caveat here is that in low income countries, the transmission channels of monetary policy are more 
blurred than in developed countries. Moreover, there is a long lag between adoption of monetary policy and its 
actual impact on real economy.  
 
10 Balance between flexibility, while anchoring inflationary expectations, is a prerequisite for success of this regime. 
Several institutional preconditions also need to be in place, including a flexible exchange rate regime and well 
functioning and adequately supervised financial sector. See Heintz, J. and Ndikumana, L. (2010), “Is there a case for 
formal inflation targeting in Sub-Saharan Africa?,” AfDB Working Paper No. 107, for a comprehensive coverage of 
suitability of this framework for sub-Saharan African countries.  
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East Africa), measures that would undermine recovery of any single country would only backfire 
to the region as a whole.  
4.  Growth-oriented medium-term policies 
A key issue for Africa’s longer term growth is financial sector development. In this area Africa 
has been lagging other regions, but the speed of financial deepening picked up prior to the crisis. 
While selective short term government interventions to provide liquidity during the crisis have 
been helpful (e.g. Nigeria), fiscal policy need to stay focused on competition and efficiency in 
this sector.  
 
One of the key lessons of the financial crisis for Africa is that capital account liberalization needs 
to be implemented gradually to prevent occurrences of “sudden stops” of capital flows. This 
requires capital account management notably through: (i) a flexible nominal exchange rate; (ii) 
sterilized interventions by the central bank, and (iii) controls on capital in- and outflows. Indeed, 
countries that have maintained some flexibility in their macroeconomic policies fared markedly 
better during the crisis.  
 
Introducing automatic stabilizers through developing well-functioning social safety nets (so far 
mostly absent in Africa, except for pilot cases) into to the government budgets should be a 
priority before the next crisis strikes. This is important as multiplier effects from discretionary 
fiscal measures in emerging and developing countries are smaller and hence less effective than in 
advanced economies. Moreover, when used in less than extraordinary circumstances, they 
undermine credibility of the fiscal stance and the entire macroeconomic policy. 
Now that Africa’s rebound is under way, reaching quickly high and sustainable growth path is 
the key challenge. To be sustainable, growth in Africa needs to be driven by the vibrant private 
sector. In this regard, macroeconomic policies will play an important role, as stability is a pre-
condition for private sector growth and development. At the same time, overly tight monetary 
stance can crowd out credit to the private sector and conservative fiscal policy can dampen the 
public infrastructure spending that provides the basis for private sector expansion. When 
choosing post-crisis macroeconomic targets, African countries will need to strike a right balance 
between stability and growth.  
However, appropriate macroeconomic policies are only necessary but not sufficient for growth. 
Reaching this objective will also hinge on structural transformation and reforms such as 
removing remaining barriers to competition, strengthening governance and business 
environment, and progressing with the regional integration.   7
Figure 1. Real GDP growth, 2006 – 2011: Africa in synch with the global recovery 
 



























Figure 2. Least growing countries in 2009 rebounded the most in 2010 
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Correl. Coef. = - 0.7503  9
Figure 3a. Fiscal and current account balances of oil exporters 
 
Figure 3b. Fiscal and current account balances of oil importers 
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Figure 4. Credit to the private sector, annual flows, 2003 – 2009 (% of GDP) 1/ 
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Figure 5. Differences between projected and actual fiscal balances, 2009 (% of GDP) 1/ 
 
Source: African Economic Outlooks (May 2009 and May 2010.  1/ Negative number indicates greater deficit or 
smaller balance than initially projected. Projections are taken from May 2009 African Economic Outlook database, 
while the actual figures are from May 2010.  
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